We use tropical geometry to analyze finite valued mechanisms. We geometrically characterize all mechanisms on arbitrary type spaces, derive geometric and algebraic criteria for weak monotonicity, incentive compatibility and revenue equivalence. As corollaries we obtain various results known in the literature and shed new light on their nature.
Introduction
Mechanisms are games devised to implement a targeted outcome in an informationally constrained economy. A well-designed mechanism elicits agents' private information truthfully given their strategic behavior. An important class consists of dominant strategy incentive compatible (D-IC) mechanisms. With quasi-linear utilities, the classical theorem of Rochet [28] states that a mechanism is (D-IC) if and only if all cycles on a certain weighted graph are nonnegative. This condition, known as cyclical monotonicity [29] , is rather difficult to work with in theory. Many papers have been devoted to identifying domains on which simpler conditions, such as weak monotonicity, are sufficient for (D-IC), see [3, 7, 30] , and further references in [33] . In particular, Saks and Yu [30] showed that if the type space is convex, then weak monotonicity implies (D-IC). Ashlagi, Braverman, Hassidim and Monderer [3] showed the converse, if the type space is not convex, then one can construct a mechanism that is weakly monotone but not (D-IC).
Contributions. Our paper contains three main results. For an arbitrary type space T , we give a geometric characterization of all possible mechanisms (Theorem 4.2), all possible weakly monotone mechanisms (Theorem 4.11), and all possible (D-IC) mechanisms (Theorem 4.6) that can arise on T . These results make checking and visualizing incentive compatibility easy, both theoretically and computationally. In particular, we obtain simple proofs of a number of known results, including those of Saks and Yu (cf. Theorem 6.1) and Ashlagi, Braverman, Hassidim and Monderer (cf. Theorem 6.2). Our proofs give a clear understanding of how the allocation rule and geometry of the type space affect (D-IC) and weak monotonicity, while being considerably shorter than existing ones.
Our characterization also allows results about revenue equivalence, such as those in [9, 15, 16, 33] , to be understood in a unified way. The characterization of revenue equivalence derived here (Corollary 4.7 and Theorem 6.3) emphasizes the role of geometry. Despite being less general than that of Heydenreich, Müller, Uetz and Vohra [15] , these results clarify the interplay of the allocation rules with the geometry of the type space for revenue equivalence explicitly. More importantly, it shows how assumptions pertaining to revenue equivalence and weak monotonicity can differ, and why. For instance, in Section 5 we construct type spaces for which there are different implementable rules, which may or may not be revenue equivalent.
Use of Tropical Geometry. We state and prove our results using tropical geometry. This is a young and exciting field with connections to algebraic geometry, combinatorics and optimization theory. It has found many applications, amongst them phylogenetics [27] , mean pay-off games [1] , computational complexity [2] , discrete events systems [4] , chemical reaction networks [26] and pairwise ranking [13] , to name a few; see the monographs [8, 22] and references therein. In particular, under the tropical algebra, deciding (D-IC) becomes a problem of solving a system of linear tropical equations. Objects in (D-IC) mechanism design problems correspond to tropical polytopes and tropical hyperplane arrangements, and economic questions about them can thus be answered using tropical convex geometry.
Many problems in mechanism design are questions of network flows [33] , which in turn can be cast as problems in tropical linear algebra, as done in [4, 5, 8] . However, there are three distinct advantages using tropical mathematics. Firstly, tropical geometry provides a convenient language with crisp notation for network flow problems. Secondly, it gives new geometric insights that would be difficult to obtain from network flows alone. Thirdly, tropical geometry is more than just tropical linear algebra. It has tools from combinatorics, integer programming, and algebraic geometry, which do not have immediate network flow interpretations. For instance, the tropical Bezóut theorem has been used to characterize general equilibrium with indivisibilities, see [5, 6, 32] . These works are the first to apply tropical geometry in microeconomic theory. The auctions studied there are a special case of mechanisms, although the questions addressed in the above papers are distinct from ours. This indicates that there are more applications of tropical geometry to economics.
The results in our paper do not reflect the limit of tropical methods. Instead, they just provide a starting point for a more systematic development and demonstrate the power of tropical thinking. On the other hand, we certainly do not claim that all problems in mechanism design can be solved tropically. Due to its idempotency, tropical algebra is less rich compared to standard algebra.
Organization. Section 2 gives the necessary concepts and results from tropical geometry. Section 3 contains the necessary terminology from mechanism design in tropical language. In Section 4 we present our main results, Theorems 4.2, 4.6 and 4.11. We collect all examples in Section 5. Section 6 elaborates on the economic interpretation of our results, including proofs of Saks-Yu (cf. Theorem 6.1) and Ashlagi-Braverman-Hassidim-Monderer (cf. Theorem 6.2).
Notation. For an integer n, define [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In general, we use the −i subscript to denote the set or vector excluding its i-th component. For instance, for
be the directed graph on m nodes with edge weights L. Let S m denote the symmetric group on [m]. For sets A, B ⊂ R m , write dist(A, B) for their distances as measured in the Euclidean norm. As a convention, we shall use the underline notation, such as ⊕, ⊙, H, . . . to indicate objects defined with arithmetic done in the min-plus tropical algebra, and the overline notation ⊕, ⊙, H, . . . to indicate the same objects defined with arithmetic in the max-plus tropical algebra.
Elements of Tropical Geometry
We will be concerned with two versions of the tropical algebra on R: max-plus and minplus. The max-plus algebra (R, ⊕, ⊙) is defined with tropical addition a⊕b := max(a, b), and tropical multiplication a ⊙ b := a + b. The min-plus algebra (R, ⊕, ⊙) is defined by a⊕b := min(a, b), a ⊙ b := a + b. These algebras are isomorphic via the map x → −x, so theorems that hold for one have obvious analogues in the other.
In short, tropical mathematics is mathematics done in the min-plus or one of its isomorphic algebras. The adjective tropical in this context was coined by French mathematicians in honor of the Hungarian-born Brazilian mathematician Imre Simon. There is no deeper meaning of the word tropical, 'it simply stands for the French view of Brazil', as put by Maclagan and Sturmfels [22] . This section is a minimal introduction to tropical linear algebra and tropical convex geometry. For a thorough treatment we refer to [4, 8, 18, 22] .
m×m be a matrix, x ∈ R m a vector and λ ∈ R a scalar. As usual, scalar-vector multiplication is defined element-wise
By Theorem 2.1 of [11] , a matrix L ∈ R m×m has a unique tropical eigenvalue. Thus one can speak of the tropical eigenvalue of a matrix L, denoted λ(L). The tropical eigenspace of
Tropical addition is idempotent: a ⊕ a = a for a ∈ R. In particular there is no subtraction. This makes tropical linear algebra different from its classical counterpart. For instance, the determinant of A equals its permanent, which is
However, because tropical equations are just a set of classically linear equations and inequalities, many tropical objects can be computed using linear programming. We give three examples relevant for this paper: computing the tropical determinant, tropical eigenvalue and tropical eigenspace.
Tropical Determinant.
Evaluating the tropical determinant means solving the assignment problem. Imagine that there are m jobs and m workers, and each worker needs to be assigned to exactly one job. Let L ij be the cost of paying worker i to do job j. The company wants to find a least cost assignment. The minimal cost is thus tdet(L). While there are m! possible matchings, to find the optimal matching, there is no need to evaluate them all. The classic assignment problem above is a linear program over the permutahedron, and can be solved efficiently with the Hungarian method [21] .
Tropical Eigenvalues.
Theorem 2.1 ( [11] ). A matrix L ∈ R m×m has a unique eigenvalue λ(L), which equals the minimum mean-weight of all simple directed cycles on m vertices.
The mean-weight of a cycle on L in the sum of the edges divided by the number of edges in the cycle. While there are exponentially many simple cycles, to compute λ(L), it is not necessary to check them all. Computing the min-plus and max-plus eigenvalue are linear programs over the normalized cycle polytope, for which there is an efficient solution, see [11, 22] .
2.4. Tropical Eigenspace. Parallel to classical linear algebra, the tropical eigenspace of an m × m matrix is generated by at most m extreme tropical eigenvectors v 1 , . . . , v m , in the sense that any x ∈ Eig(L) can be written as
for some a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R. As a set, tropical eigenspaces are polytropes [18] , so-called because such a set is both a tropical and an ordinary polytope, see Section 2.8 below. To find Eig(L), one first subtracts λ(L) element-wise from L and reduces to the case λ(L) = 0. In this case, numerically, v ij can be found as the value of the shortest path from i to j on G(L). Abstractly, these vectors are the column vectors of the Kleene star of L. In the following definition I denotes the min-plus identity matrix with zeros on its diagonal and +∞ elsewhere.
For this reason, Kleene stars play a fundamental role in tropical spectral theory, and thus have been extensively studied [4, 8, 17, 31] . They are also known as strong transitive closures [8, §1.6.2.1], or distance matrix [24] . Kleene stars, and thus the tropical generators of a tropical eigenspace, can be computed by multiplication and addition of tropical matrices. 2.5. Tropical Projective Torus. In many economic problems only relative valuations or prices matter, not their absolute values. In tropical terms, this means that valuations and prices are points in the tropical projective torus TP m−1 . This shall be our ambient space when speaking about geometry in mechanism design problems.
A set S ⊂ R m is closed under tropical scalar multiplication if for all a ∈ R we have a ⊙ x = (a + x 1 , . . . , a + x m ) ∈ S whenever x ∈ S. Examples include the image of a matrix
or its tropical eigenspace Eig(L). It is sufficient to consider such a set modulo tropical scalar multiplication. Define an equivalence relation ∼ on R m via
The space R m modulo ∼ is called the tropical projective torus, or tropical affine space TP m−1 . Explicitly, it is R m modulo the line spanned by the all-one vector
Note that the tropical scalar multiplication does not depend on max or min, so on the same space TP m−1 one can speak of max-plus as well as min-plus geometric objects such as tropical polytopes and tropical hyperplane arrangements.
We follow the convention in [18, 22] and identify TP m−1 with R m−1 by normalizing the first coordinate via the following homeomorphism.
In particular, we use this map to visualize sets in TP 2 . Of course, one could choose other normalizations, such as setting the i-th coordinate to zero for some other i ∈ [m], or require that the sum of the coordinates is a constant.
Often, checking whether a set S ⊆ R m is closed under tropical scalar multiplication is straight forward. In such cases, we shall write S ⊆ TP m−1 without taking explicit notice. In particular, we will often write an element x ∈ TP m−1 as a vector in R m . 
Let L be the matrix whose i-th column is c i . By rewriting, one obtains
It is immediate that tconv(c 1 , . . . , c m ) ⊂ TP m−1 , and that for constants a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R,
Thus, we shall work in TP m−1 , viewing both {c 1 , . . . , c m } and their tropical convex hull as a subset of TP m−1 . Note that for a particular tropical polytope P , the matrix L such that Im(L) = P is only defined up to tropical scalings of its columns. Unless stated otherwise, we shall rescale L as to have zeros on its diagonal. This associates P to a unique matrix L.
For the rest of this section, fix a matrix L ∈ R m×m . Let c i denote its i-th column vector. The tropical polytope Im(L) can also be thought of in terms of its supporting tropical hyperplanes.
, the min-plus tropical hyperplane with apex −p, denoted H(p), is the set of z ∈ R m such that the minimum in the tropical inner product
is achieved at least twice. Analogously, the max-plus tropical hyperplane with apex −p, denoted H(p), is the set of z ∈ R m such that the maximum in
is achieved at least twice. (4) is achieved only at j. That is,
Its closure is the j-th closed sector of the max-plus hyperplane with apex −p,
This is the set of z ∈ R m such that the maximum (4) is achieved at j and possibly at a second coordinate.
, that is,
Note that the boundary is the union of m − 1 halfhyperplanes
where the k-th piece L jk is the set
As before, we use the underline notation to mean the analogous quantity in min-plus. For instance, L j , the j-th sector of the min-plus hyperplane with apex −L j in TP m−1 , is
The intersections of their various sectors partitions
The numbering of the sectors correspond to the coordinate at which the minimum is achieved once. For a given point p ∈ TP m−1 we can ask for its position relative to the tropical hyperplanes associated to L. This combinatorial information is encoded in the covectors.
m×m with
One can think of a covector as the adjacency matrix of a (m, m) bipartite graph. It has edge (k, i) iff p is in sector k of the hyperplane with apex at −L i , the i-th row of L. Covectors are a central concept in tropical convex geometry. This idea was put forward by Develin and Sturmfels as combinatorial types [12] and was subsequently further developed by Joswig and Loho [19] .
Points in the same open cell of H(L) have the same covector. Thus, we can speak of the covector of a cell ν of
The following is a characterization of bounded cells in a tropical hyperplane arrangement by their covectors.
Polytropes and Tropical Eigenspaces.
Definition 2.12. A polytrope P ⊂ TP m−1 is a tropical polytope that is also an ordinary polytope.
The term polytrope was coined by Joswig and Kulas [18] . There are many equivalent characterizations of polytropes. We collect the ones relevant for this paper here. The first three results are classical results, see [8, 18, 22] . The last two statements are characterizations by Murota [24] , who calls polytropes L-convex sets. Proposition 2.13. Let P ⊂ TP n−1 be a non-empty set. The following are equivalent.
(1) P is a polytrope.
(2) There exists a matrix M ∈ R m×m such that P = Eig(M). (3) There exists a matrix M ∈ R m×m such that
(4) P = Im(M * ) for a unique Kleene star M * . (5) P is both a min-plus tropical polytope and a max-plus tropical polytope (6) P is both a min-plus convex set and max-plus convex set.
As a set in TP m−1 , a polytrope P is a compact convex polytope of dimension k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}. Say that P is full-dimensional if it has dimension m − 1. A polytrope of dimension k < m − 1 in TP m−1 is obtained by embedding a k-dimensional polytrope into a k-dimensional subspace of TP m−1 defined by intersections of hyperplanes of the form
. In matrix terms, this means that if we write a polytrope P as P = Im(L), then as a set in TP m−1 , precisely k + 1 of its columns (or rows) are unique. Thus, it is often sufficient to consider the theory for full-dimensional polytropes.
2.9. Row-Column Duality and Minimal Polytropes. There is a trivial duality between the min and max algebra stemming from the fact that for a, b ∈ R, min{a, b} = − max{−a, −b}.
This translates to a trivial duality between row and column space of a matrix L ∈ R m×m as follows.
Lemma 2.14.
There is a more astonishing row and column duality, due to Develin and Sturmfels [12] Theorem 2.15
There is an isomorphism between the polyhedral complexes Im(L) and Im(L ⊤ ) obtained by restricting the piecewise linear maps
By part (5) 
is both a max-plus and min-plus tropical polytope, it has the same set of min-plus and max-plus generators. An example is the standard minimal polytrope ∆ m−1 = conv(0, e 1 , e 1 + e 2 , e 1 + e 2 + e 3 , . . . , e 1 + . . . + e m ) + R ·(1, . . . , 1), where conv denotes the classical convex hull, and e i is the i-th standard basis vector in R m , that is, the vector with 1 in the i-th coordinate and zero elsewhere. Note that for this polytrope, its set of max-plus tropical generators, min-plus tropical generators and vertices as ordinary polytope all coincide. In a sense, this is the only polytrope with this property. The following theorem is essentially a restatement of [24, Theorem 7.24] . It is key to the characterization of weak monotonicity in mechanism design, see Section 6.1. Definition 2.16. Say that a polytrope P ⊂ TP m−1 of dimension k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , m − 1} is minimal if as a classical polytope, it has k + 1 vertices. Theorem 2.17. Let P be a full-dimensional tropical polytope in TP m−1 . Then the following are equivalent
(1) P is a full-dimensional minimal polytrope.
(2) P is both a min-plus and max-plus full-dimensional tropical polytope, with the same set of m generators. (3) Up to permutations, there exists a unique matrix A ∈ R m×m such that A = −A ⊤ , P = Im(A), and as a subset of TP m−1 , the columns of A are unique. (4) The Kleene star A * of P has the form
for some vector p ∈ TP m−1 and some scalar a ∈ R, where A * ∆ m−1 is the Kleene star of ∆ m−1 . (5) Up to permutations, there exists a vector p ∈ TP m−1 and a scalar a ∈ R such that
Proof. Proposition 2.13 implies (2) ⇔ (3) and (4) ⇔ (5). We first prove (1) ⇔ (5). By [24, Theorem 7.24] , any polytrope can be regularly decomposed as unions of smaller polytropes. It follows from this proof, using the Lovász extension of the corresponding L-convex functions over P , that the minimal polytropes are precisely the convex hull of maximal chains on {0, 1} m . Up to permutation on [m], such a chain is lexicographic. The convex hull of the lexicographic chain is ∆ m−1 . So up to permutation, scaling and translation, a minimal polytrope P equals ∆ m−1 , as needed. Now we prove (5) ⇔ (2). Suppose P is given by (5) . Then it is straight-forward to check that it satisfies (2). Conversely, suppose (2) . Due to [24, Theorem 7.24] , any L-convex function over P must also be L-concave. Thus, it must be a classical hyperplane. So P has a unique Lovász extension, which implies that up to scaling and translation, it must be a simplex supported on chains of {0, 1} m . Since P is full-dimensional, the chain is maximal, and thus we have (5). Let P = Im(L). One can check that P = Im(A). The matrix L is the unique matrix with zero diagonal associated with P .
On the graph G(L), the mean-cycle lengths of two-cycles are 1 2 (1 + δ), 
Mechanism Design in Tropical Notation
We consider an economy with m ∈ N outcomes which is populated by n ∈ N agents with quasi-linear utilities, as in [33, §4] . For i ∈ [n], agent i has a true type t i ∈ R m , drawn by nature and privately known only to him. The tuple of all possible true types forms the type space T ⊆ R m×n . A direct mechanism (g, p) consists of an outcome function g : T → [m] and a payment function p : T → R n . We focus on dominant strategy equilibria in the game induced by the mechanism. A strategy for agent i is a declared type s i ∈ T i for each possible true type. After all agents have submitted their reports, the game's outcome is g(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ [m] with payment-vector p(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ R n . Agent i chooses his report to maximize his utility, which is
with payment vector p ∈ R n . We say that an agent tells the truth if his declared type is his true type. A central goal of mechanism design is to find mechanisms (g, p) under which all agents report truthfully and the desired outcome is implemented in equilibrium. For a mechanism (g, p) , say that truth-telling is dominant strategy incentive compatible, abbreviated (D-IC), if for each agent i ∈ [n], each t −i ∈ T −i and each t ∈ T i (t −i ),
That is, no matter what the other agents declare, each agent always maximizes his utility by reporting his true type.
For each agent i and types t
For a given outcome function g, the classical theorem of Rochet [28] gives a necessary and sufficient condition for (D-IC) in terms of cycles on the allocation graph G(L g,t −i ), [14, 33] .
Theorem 3.2 (Rochet). A mechanism g is (D-IC) if and only if for each i ∈ [n] and each
We can restrict to the single agent case. Fix i ∈ [n] and t −i . Let T = T i , define g : T → [m] via g(t) := g(t, t −i ) and similarly p : T → R via p(t) := p i ([t, t −i ]). Without loss, assume
By rewriting (D-IC), we obtain the analogous tropical formulation
That is, deciding (D-IC) is solving a tropical linear equation. With this view, we restate essential definitions of mechanism design in tropical notation as follows. 
Definition 3.4. Suppose g is (D-IC). Say that g is revenue equivalent (RE) if for each i ∈ [n] and each t
For ease of reference, we also collect the following central definitions here.
Definition 3.5. Fix a type space T ⊂ R m . Say that a given matrix L ∈ R m×m is realizable if there exists some outcome function g :
⊤ is element-wise nonnegative.
The Geometry of Mechanism Design -Main Results

Geometric Characterization of all Mechanisms.
We fix an agent i and the types of other agents t −i ∈ T −i . An allocation rule g defines the matrix L g,t −i . Our characterization rests on inverting this map. This allows us to study mechanisms on the space of matrices.
It is without loss to assume that T ⊆ TP m−1 . In terms of economics, this means that only relative valuation of the agents matter for truthfulness. Though it is common to normalize in equilibrium theory, this is rather uncommon in mechanism design. In our setting it turns out to be natural and very useful.
We say that L separates
and in addition, whenever I jk = I kj = {s} for some s ∈ TP m−1 , then there exists a (j, k)-
The witnessing sequence condition is to exclude strange cases in which two sectors are held in place by one point. In such a case, the dominant arrangement will move if the shared point on the boundary is assigned to different outcomes. Thus such a matrix cannot be realizable, see Example 5.2 below. We now state our first main result, which geometrically characterizes all possible mechanisms on arbitrary type-spaces. For L to be realizable, L needs to separate T , as for each i, j ∈ [m], we want
so this infimum needs to be achievable by some sequence in g −1 (i). The other condition comes from the following observation.
m×m is realizable with outcome function g :
Proof. For any
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Suppose L is realizable with outcome function g. By Lemma 4.3, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, g
Since g partitions T , we have that,
this infimum is achieved either by a (j, k)-witness, or by a point t ∈ L jk . So dist(T ∩L j , L jk ) = 0. Furthermore, if I jk = I kj = {s}, then if g(s) = j, the infimum in the definition of L kj must be achieved by a (k, j)-witness, so there must exist a (k, j)-witness. Conversely, if g(s) = k, then there must exist a (j, k)-witness. This shows that L separates T at {j, k}. Since the pair was chosen arbitrarily, L separates T . For the converse direction, suppose L is a matrix that separates T . Define g :
The remaining points lie on the boundary T ∩ j,k∈[m],j =k L jk = j,k∈[m],j =k I jk . Assign these points such that points on I jk have either outcome j or k, and such that on every non-empty boundary I jk there exists a point with outcome j. The only case where this cannot be done is if I jk = I kj = {s}. In this case, if there is a (j, k)-witness, set g(s) = k, else, since L separates T , there must exists a (k, j)-witness, so set g(s) = j. We claim that L is realized by g.
By the above assignment, there must be a point in I jk or a (j, k)-witness in g −1 (j). So the infimum is achieved, thus g realizes L as claimed.
It is immediate that when two rows of L coincide in
In that case, one can reduce checking realizability by projecting onto the subspace x m−1 −x m = 0, and deleting the last coordinate. In economic terms, this means that under any incentive compatible payment, outcomes m and m − 1 have the same transfers. We can strengthen this argument to an equivalence by introducing liftable type spaces. Essentially, this condition requires that the type space has enough points, so that upon embedding into a spce of one dimension higher, there are enough witnesses. • w rk + q rk ≥ 3
T is non-empty, and q kr > 0.
We now obtain the following dimension reduction result, which follows straight from Theorem 4.2 by a definition chase. This geometric result allows us to visualize and prove incentive compatibility, or its failure, on arbitrary type spaces without calculating cycle lengths. When λ(L) = 0, it gives a geometric description for the tropical eigenspace of L, i.e. the tropical semi-module of incentive compatible payments. We defer the discussion of the economic interpretation to Section 6.3. Proof. The assertion (1) ⇔ (2) is the Rochet theorem, see [33] for proof using network flows. Since L has zero diagonal, the identity assignment has value 0. So (3) ⇔ (4). Let us prove (2) ⇔ (3). Since L has zero diagonal, the identity assignment has value 0. Thus tdet(L) ≤ 0. Suppose (2). Any assignment σ ∈ S m can be decomposed as a union of simple directed cycles on a disjoint set of vertices. Thus (2) implies tdet(L) ≥ 0, and so we have (3). Now instead, suppose (3). Any simple cycle C can be extended to a permutation by adding self-loops at vertices which are not in C. Thus we have (2).
Corollary 4.9. For each i ∈ [n] and t −i ∈ T −i checking whether all cycles of G(L g,t −1 ) are nonnegative can be done algorithmically using the Hungarian algorithm for perfect matching.
4.4.
Characterization of Weak Monotonicity. Weak monotonicity has received wide attention in the literature, it is known to be sufficient on some domains, cf. Theorem 6.1. The following characterizations of weak monotonicity can be traced back to [10] .
Proof. Note that L j and L k are closed polyhedra, so they either do not intersect, intersect on their boundaries, or intersect in their interiors. So it is sufficient to prove the last two equivalences in the statements. Suppose there exists t ∈ L j ∩ L k . Then by definition of the sectors, L jk + L kj ≤ (t j − t k ) + (t k − t j ) = 0. In particular, strict equality holds if and only if t lies on the boundary of L j ∩ L k , while strict inequality holds if and only if t lies in either of their interiors. In that case, one can pick a 
Examples
In this section we illustrate our results with various examples of mechanisms with three outcomes (m = 3). In particular, these examples show that it is simple to construct mechanisms and verify realizability, incentive compatibility (D-IC) and revenue equivalence (RE).
In all figures, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the max-plus sector L j has apex −L j , where L j (up to tropical scaling) is the j-th row of L. The boundary of the max-plus sector L j is shown in blue. The boundary of the min-plus sector L j is shown in red. Type spaces are shaded in gray. The tropical eigenspace Eig(L) is shaded green. and L 3 is the green region, which is non-empty. This region is the tropical eigenspace Eig 0 (L) with eigenvalue zero, which corresponds to incentive compatible payments. Example 5.2 (Realizable and non-realizable matrices). On a common type space, Figure 3 shows the dominant arrangement D(L) of a realizable matrix L in panel (a), and that of a non-realizable matrix in panel (b). The type space T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 } consists of four points in TP 2 . In Figure 3 (a), the mechanism g is defined by g(t 2 ) = g(t 3 ) = 3, g(t 1 ) = 1 and g(t 4 ) = 2. One can readily verify that L g,t −i = L. Now consider the matrix L defined via its dominant arrangement D(L) in Figure 3 (b) . By Theorem 4.2, for a mechanism g to realize L as L = L g,t −i , we must have g(t 4 ) = 2, g(t 1 ) = 1, g(t 3 ) = 3, and g(t 2 ) either 1 or 3. Suppose g(
So we cannot have g(t 2 ) = 1. Now suppose instead that g(t 2 ) = 3. Then D(L g,t −i ) must equal the arrangement in Figure 3 
Thus L is not realizable. Realizability fails since L does not separate T at {1, 3}. Here, one has I 13 = L 13 ∩ L 31 ∩ T = {t 2 }, but there is no (1, 3) nor a (3, 1) witnesses. 
L k , and L separates T . One can define a mechanism that realizes L as follows. Set g(t 1 ) = g(t 2 ) = 1, g(t 4 ) = 2, g(t 3 ) = 2, and g(t) = 3 for all remaining points t ∈ T . By Theorem 4.11, in any mechanism g that realizes Figure 4 (a), the two-cycle (2 → 3 → 2) is negative. Thus g is not D-IC. 
The red dot is the unique point in the tropical eigenspace, so g is RE. Figure 5 , the type space T is the closed half-space shaded gray. Any mechanism g that realizes the arrangement D(L) given in Figure 5 (a) must assign −L 3 to outcome 3, −L 2 to outcome 2, and assign points in the interior of L 1 and L 2 to outcomes 1 and 2, respectively. Points on the boundary of any pair L j and L k can take either outcome j or k. By Theorem 4.11, any realizable g has all of its two-cycles equal to 0. Figure 5 (b) shows the tropical eigenspace Eig(L g,t −i ) as the intersection of the min-plus sectors L j . In this case the eigenspace consists of a point, so the mechanism is D-IC and RE. This example is an isntance where Theorem 6.1, below applies.
(c) On the same type space, another mechanism that is RE. Figure 6 depicts a non-convex type space (gray shaded) on which any implementable mechanism must be revenue equivalent. Figures 6 (a) and (b) show a weakly monotone mechanism that is not D-IC. On convex type spaces such a situation cannot occur. Figure 6 (c) depicts a D-IC mechanism that is RE. Note that the closure of the type-space is not path-connected.
Economic Interpretation
We give simple geometric proofs of the theorems by Saks-Yu [30] and Ashlagi-BravermanHassidim-Monderer [3] on the sufficiency of weak monotonicity on convex domains. Using the simple geometric characterization of revenue equivalence in Corollary 4.7, we obtain a special case of a theorem by Heydenreich-Muller-Uetz-Vohra [15] . We conclude with a discussion of the economic interpretation of Theorem 4.6 in terms of linear programming duality.
6.1. Convexity and Weak Monotonicity. Theorem 6.1 (Saks-Yu). Suppose L is realizable, and all two-cycles of L are nonnegative. 
. By Theorem 2.17, P is a full-dimensional minimal polytrope in TP k−1 . Note that convexity of T and the property λ(L) = 0 is preserved under translating, scaling, and permuting the labels of the [m] outcomes. By performing these operations and using Theorem 2.17, one can assume that P equals the standard minimal polytrope ∆ k−1 , and L equals the unique matrix associated with ∆ k−1 such that L = −L ⊤ and Im(L) = ∆ k−1 . In this case, one can check that
On the other hand, since T is convex, there exists a point in T for each L jk . Thus
So P must have trivial relative interior, that is, it must be a point. So k = 1, P = Eig(L) = {−L 1 }, and we have revenue equivalence.
In our proof, we invoked the assumption that T is convex only at the end to show that P ⊆ T . In particular, it is easy to reverse this proof and obtain a simple proof of the converse of Saks-Yu. This result was first proved by Ashlagi, Braverman, Hassidim and Monderer [3] Theorem 6.2 (Ashlagi-Braverman-Hassidim-Monderer). Suppose T = T i is closed. If T is not convex, then there exists a mechanism g such that all two-cycles of L g,t −i are nonnegative, but λ(L) < 0. for some g. By construction, all the two-cycles of L are zero, and the polytrope P has full-dimension, so λ(L) < 0.
6.2. Weak Monotonicity and Revenue Equivalence. The literature on revenue equivalence is vast [9, 15, 16, 20, 23, 25, 33] , see [9, 33] for a comprehensive review. Many results give conditions that ensure revenue equivalence for all implementable allocation rules. As was pointed out in [15] , this is a very stringent requirement as there are cases in which revenue equivalent and non-revenue equivalent mechanisms can coexist on the same type-space. The following corollary of Proposition 2.13 is a special case of the characterization of revenue equivalence in [15] , it is the linear algebraic analogue of the geometric characterization in Corollary 4.7. (1) L has a unique eigenvector in
6.3. An Interpretation via Linear Programming Duality. Loosely formulated we have the following duality. The rows of L g,t −i correspond to the agent's problem (the informed side of the economy), he chooses optimal reports given his type. The columns of (L g,t −i ) * correspond to the problem of the mechanism (the uninformed side), it must simultaneously balance all incentives of reporting a given type. This observation can be made precise via linear programing duality and the geometry of the dominant arrangements. Consider the j-th row of −L g,t −i , its entries −L g,t −i jk = sup
correspond to the most any agent whose truthful statement would entail outcome j could gain by misreporting to change the outcome to k. With quasi-linear utilities the set of payments that offset the incentive to misreport is L j . To see this, note that by definition p ∈ L j = {p ∈ TP m−1 : L jk + p k ≥ p j for k = j}.
Thus inf g −1 (j) {t j − t k } + p k ≥ p j and hence t j − p j ≥ t k − p k for all t ∈ g −1 (j). However, there is a consistency requirement. Since the mechanism is informationally constrained, it can only set one payment that must incentivize all possible types simultaneously.
Suppose L g,t −i is realizable and λ(L g,t −i ) = 0. The min-plus covector of p ∈ Eig 0 (L g,t −i ) with respect to L g,t −i systematically lists for which types the incentive constraints hold, i.e.
The intersection of all the sectors L j for j ∈ [m] is the set of jointly incentive compatible payments. Theorem 4.6 identified this set as the the tropical eigenspace, i.e. the tropical semi-module of D-IC payments. It is the min-plus image of (L g,t −i ) * .
Rewriting the eigenvector condition, we obtain
The terms −L g,t −i j,k − p k are utility gains relative to truth-telling net payments. Thus the mechanism makes any agent pay the most he could gain.
This can be linked to linear programming duality viz. A reporting strategy of an agent is to announce a preference for some allocation that maximizes his utility, i.e. a probability distribution s ∈ ∆ m−1 . Recall that types in TP m−1 are normalized, i.e. t = (0, t 2 −t 1 , . . . , t m − t 1 ). The mechanism tries to find a vector p ∈ TP m−1 that solves the following family of linear programs simultaneously for all j ∈ [m].
(P) inf
The inner problem is the agent's, he maximizes utility relative truth-telling. Now, suppose p ∈ Eig 0 (L g,t −i ) and hence coVec L g,t −i (p) has ones on its diagonal. It follows that for any j ∈ [m] and any t ∈ g −1 (j):
Thus, the inner problem of (P) is maximized by setting s j (t) = 1 and s k (t) = 0 for k = j, i.e. truth-telling. Implicitly this is the content of Theorem 4. s r (t r − t j ) − (p r − p j ) − µ ∀t ∈ g −1 (j)
Explicitly the problem is to minimize µ subject to µ ≥ 0 and (t k −t j )−(p k −p j ) ≤ µ for k = j. In economics µ(t) is the shadow-value of a agent with type t from lying. If µ > 0 then the agent has a strict incentive to misreport. For p ∈ Eig 0 (L g,t −i ) this program is solved by setting µ(t) = 0. Thus (P) is the agent's problem of maximizing his utility relative to truth-telling for given payments. Problem (D) is the mechanism's problem of minimizing incentives to lie given optimizing behavior. By flipping sectors at their apices and intersecting the regions L j , we geometrically characterize the set of payments that makes truth-telling a solution to this problem.
If the eigenvalue is not zero and the eigenspace does not equal the intersection of the L j sectors, then (P) does not have such a solution, since by the covector criterion some incentive constraint must always be violated, and thus (D) is solved by setting µ > 0 for some type.
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